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 10  Normativity With a Human Face 
 Placing Intentional Norms and 
Intentional Agents Back in Nature 
 Glenda  Satne and  Bernardo  Ainbinder 
 One cannot simply posit a correlation between experience and nature, 
between seeing-as and seeing what-is; one must show what this sense of 
nature amounts to through an account of the evidence in which it is given 
as nature. 
 —( Crowell 2001 , 17) 
 Intentionality, Normativity, and the Space of Reasons 
 There is much agreement in the philosophical literature that intentional 
states, including beliefs, desires, intentional actions, and the like, are can-
didates for normative assessment. That is, they can be evaluated with 
respect to standards of propriety, such as success, fi tness, accuracy, and, 
above all, truth. Intentional states are marked by the property of being 
directed toward objects and properties in the environment which they 
can be about and can also fail to adequately represent, thus becoming 
candidates for truth-assessment. Underscoring this point, John Hauge-
land claims that “to have intentionality is to have (semantic) content” 
( Haugeland 1990 , 384). 
 Sellars has articulated this distinction further. According to Sellars, 
intentional states are distinctively characterized by belonging to what he 
labeled “the space of reasons.” He described this space by contrasting it 
with the space of nature, claiming that they are governed by two di erent 
kinds of normativity. While the normativity of nomological generaliza-
tions, proper to scientifi c natural laws, characterizes the realm of nature, 
the normativity of reasons and rational principles is characteristic of 
human actions and performances and of intentional states, such as beliefs 
and desires in particular. Accordingly, the logical space of reasons is not 
the space in which we describe the psychology of the acts of thinking, but 
the space in which our justifi catory credentials are at issue. 
 McDowell, following Sellars, claims that “[w]e must sharply dis-
tinguish natural-scientifi c intelligibility from the kind of intelligibility 
something acquires when we situate it in the logical space of reasons” 
(McDowell 1996, xix). Nevertheless, McDowell warns us, we must be 
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especially careful as to the implications of such a distinction. In particu-
lar, one must avoid the confusion that underlies its identifi cation with “a 
dichotomy between the natural and the normative” (Ibid.). Such a confu-
sion would amount to losing any possibility of accounting for the way 
in which the world has normative signifi cance for us, e.g., the possibility 
that the world itself play a justifi catory role for our beliefs. According 
to McDowell, both Davidson and Sellars, by sharply distinguishing the 
normative and the natural, end up endorsing a view “about experience 
[that] disqualifi es it from intelligibly constituting a tribunal” (McDowell 
1996, xvi). 
 Against Sellars’s and Davidson’s conception of the rational, McDowell 
surmises that in order to avoid, on the one hand, endorsing a form of 
dualism—i.e., separating causes from reasons—and, on the other, emp-
tying our empirical beliefs from empirical content, we need “to place 
norms in nature.” His strategy in this regard is both simple and bold: we 
must enrich our concept of nature so that it encompasses the normativity 
of rational demands. 1
 McDowell rightly calls his proposal a “rehabilitation of empiricism,” 
the very empiricism that Sellars—who identifi ed the empirical with an 
unacceptable notion of the Given—and Davidson—who rejected the 
view that we can make sense of experience as something other than a 
blind cause—had deemed untenable. According to McDowell, Sell-
ars’s and Davidson’s conclusions depend on surrendering the notion of 
nature to the realm of pure causal law, a “disenchanted nature” that 
“does not embrace the space of reasons” (McDowell 1996, 84). If 
the notion of nature is so understood, only two options are left open: 
(1) to embrace what McDowell calls “bald naturalism” replacing rea-
sons with pure causes or (2) to endorse a sort of dualism that conceives 
of reasons as belonging to a self-contained space that is only a ected 
by causes from the outside. Sellars and Davidson embrace option (2). 
Resisting this dilemma, McDowell puts forward the idea that experiences 
are not mere sensations but “themselves cases of our sensory capacities 
at work, as opposed to being merely caused by our sensory capacities” 
(McDowell 2009, 158). According to McDowell, we can understand the 
world’s impact on belief-formation as belonging already to the concep-
tual sphere. Experiences are “like beliefs in being actualizations of our 
conceptual capacities and so able, consistently with the basic principles 
that underlie Davidson’s thinking here, to be rationally and not merely 
causally relevant to our thinking” (Ibid). The outcome of this thought 
is the idea that causal relations need not be exhaustively described as 
the “domain of physical fact.” According to McDowell, only if beliefs 
and experiences can be about the world and thus be either correct or 
incorrect with respect to it, will we be in the position to account for 
how experience is actually capable of playing its role as a warrant for 
beliefs. Conversely, if experience could not be granted a rational role 
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in the formation of beliefs, then as Kant warned us, we would be left 
with empty concepts: without intuitions concepts would be “spinning in 
a void” (McDowell 1996, 11). 
 Steven Crowell’s work is to be praised for highlighting how the phe-
nomenological tradition can contribute to the aforementioned debate 
concerning intentionality and normativity. And while Crowell shares 
many of McDowell’s main tenets and his general aim of integrating expe-
rience into the space of reasons, he questions the lack of an adequate phe-
nomenological account of how perceptual experience can be normatively 
informed. In his view, McDowell lacks “the necessary theory of percep-
tion or intuitive givenness to remove the appearance of dogmatism in 
its appeal to the space of meaning” ( Crowell 2001 , 19). Crowell argues 
that phenomenology o ers a remedy for this problem, namely, the best 
strategy for placing norms in nature. In this sense, phenomenology would 
be the best way to pursue the project of rehabilitating empiricism while 
simultaneously acknowledging the distinctive character of normatively 
contentful intentionality. That is what would be required for an empiri-
cism “that recognizes not only quarks and trees, but numbers, battles, 
and passions” and is in a position to resist not only skepticism, but reduc-
tionism as well” ( Crowell 2001 , 19). 
 In this chapter, we will follow Crowell’s path and explore to what 
extent such a project can be carried out. We will contend that Crowell’s 
attempt to provide a phenomenological account of intentionality makes 
important progress but is nevertheless incomplete. Phenomenology 
does indeed o er the best strategy for approaching this project. Unlike 
McDowell’s proposal, phenomenology does not commit to the idea that 
intentionality is always conceptual and hence, as we will show, it o ers 
the right tools for avoiding some important shortcomings of McDowell’s 
position. But if Crowell succeeds in placing norms in nature through his 
phenomenological account of perceptual experience, he still shares with 
McDowell and Haugeland the idea that intentionality proper is to be 
identifi ed with full-fl edged normatively contentful capacities. This leads 
him to reject the possibility—a possibility actually explored by Husserl 
and other phenomenologists—of accounting for (i) the role that biologi-
cal constraints play in the exercise of rational capacities, and (ii) the way 
in which the world we are directed to is shared by other creatures that 
themselves disclose the world in di erent ways. Lacking resources for 
accommodating (i) and (ii), Crowell’s view turns out to be incapable of 
making sense of how intentional agents are themselves placed in nature. 
We will claim that placing intentional agents in nature is not only pos-
sible, but also necessary if we are to bring Crowell’s and McDowell’s 
project of rehabilitating empiricism to completion. 
 We will proceed as follows. In  the next section, we will analyze 
McDowell’s attempt to place norms in nature, highlight its shortcom-
ings, and follow Crowell in providing a phenomenological alternative 
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to his view. In the third section, we will analyze both McDowell’s and 
Crowell’s approaches to the problem of placing intentional agents in 
nature. We will diagnose how and why they fall short. In the fi nal sec-
tion, we will sketch an alternative strategy for successfully “rehabilitat-
ing empiricism,” namely, by placing both norms and intentional agents 
in nature. 
 Placing Intentional Norms in Nature 
 Crowell concurs with McDowell on the idea that “the challenge is to say 
how the world can be independent of our thinking while still having a 
rational—and not merely causal—bearing on what we think” (Crowell 
2010, 153). This challenge can be put in terms of two generally accepted 
conditions for establishing what counts as contentful normativity: (1) the 
objectivity condition: that contentful states must be about an independ-
ent world they can fail to adequately represent, and (2) the fi rst-person 
condition: that intentional states must not be merely cases of acting 
“according to a norm”—the kind of normativity that applies to phe-
nomena under scientifi c nomological generalizations—but rather cases 
of acting “in virtue of a norm,” i.e., states of subjects who are conscious 
of, responsive to, and responsible for the norms specifi ed by said states. 
It is this fi rst-personal kind of normative relation that holds for states in 
the space of reasons. 
 Crowell (2008 , 2012a) himself acknowledges the need for accommo-
dating these conditions in accounting for perceptual states. According 
to Crowell, unlike Sellars and Brandom for whom “perception plays no 
justifi catory role but is just an entry move into the realm of inferentially 
governed conceptual relations” (Crowell 2010, 150–1), McDowell cor-
rectly saw that experience, along with other rational states, belongs in 
the space of reasons. But, in his view, accommodating (1) and (2) is para-
mount for reclaiming a role for the notion of “experience” as conceived 
in the phenomenological tradition and not merely in the way McDowell 
seeks to incorporate it. 
 Notably, both McDowell and Crowell agree that a correct account 
of intentionality involves a commitment to some form of empiricism 
(McDowell 1996, xviii;  Crowell 2001 , 19). However, it is at this point 
that Crowell introduces his criticism of McDowell’s position, namely, 
that the latter fails to provide an adequate notion of experience: 
 McDowell seems to hold that perceptual content must have a con-
ceptual structure since only predication, an operation with concepts, 
establishes the object as a norm, places it in the space of reasons. But 
just this point makes McDowell’s position elusive, for in perception 
no such predication takes place. 
 ( Crowell 2013 , 126) 
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 Thus, McDowell’s commitment to a conceptual understanding of the 
space of reasons leads to a propositional conception of perceptual states 
that Crowell deems inadequate. The problem is that McDowell, follow-
ing Sellars, thinks of this space of reasons in purely conceptual terms. He 
thereby wrongly identifi es  seeing a cat on the mat and  seeing that the cat 
is on the mat . 2 According to Crowell, McDowell is unable to draw the rel-
evant distinction between  seeing something and  seeing that something is 
the case , for he lacks a non-conceptual notion of experience. While after 
Mind and World McDowell seems to have discarded that propositional 
notion of the content of experience, he still holds that experience should 
be conceived as informed by “conceptual capacities at work.” Crowell 
acknowledges such a shift in McDowell’s thinking but argues that the 
problem remains, since “both kinds of content remain conceptual” (see 
 Crowell 2013 , 127n3). 3 Crowell argues that an adequate notion of expe-
rience must be able to explain how a perceptual state can be meaningful 
and thus normative without being conceptual. 
 At this juncture, Crowell introduces his more general claim, namely 
that phenomenology is uniquely suited to provide an encompassing pic-
ture of the normativity of experience that accommodates the aforemen-
tioned conditions (1) and (2), i.e., that it is capable of accounting for the 
way in which we are fi rst-personally responsive to objective norms in 
experiencing the world, while not understanding such norms as involving 
conceptual capacities. 
 Phenomenology fares better than McDowell’s view in accounting for 
the way in which experience is norm-governed because it characterizes 
perception in normative terms without recourse to conceptuality. Indeed, 
“phenomenologists concerned with the question of the normative in per-
ception have tried to go further” in characterizing experience ( Crowell 
2013 , 127). A paradigmatic example of the kind of perceptual-yet-not-
conceptual normative constraint that belongs to experience thematized 
by phenomenologists is the relation that holds in perceptually experi-
encing an object, for example in vision, between an actually observed 
aspect of the object and other aspects of the same object, which are not 
in view. When I see a matchbox in front of me, my experience is not the 
mere experience of the seen side of the matchbox but a case of seeing 
the matchbox as such, including the sides that are hidden from view. The 
unseen aspects of the matchbox are part of my actual perception of the 
matchbox even though they are not directly perceived. This is shown 
by the fact that there are several further actions that I can perform with 
respect to the object that can confi rm the presence of such hidden aspects, 
e.g., I can turn the object around and see the other sides, and I can then 
see if they look more or less like the one I had previously seen, and so on. 
Alternatively, if, for instance, I turned the matchbox around and its back-
side mysteriously disappeared, I would think that something is wrong, 
that it was not a matchbox after all: maybe it was a hallucination or a 
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trompe l’oeil . These relations between the seen and unseen aspects of 
objects of perceptual experience are not merely causal but normative: 
the unseen aspects of the same object are normatively relevant for my 
actual perception of it and for its epistemic credentials. This network of 
normative relations that govern perceptual experience is at the center of 
Crowell’s “quasi-inferentialist” account of perceptual normativity. In his 
words, “the way the world and things in the world are taken in experi-
ence is, for each, a function of (as Husserl puts it) their ‘intentional impli-
cations’ or (as Heidegger puts it) the ‘referential totality of signifi cance’ ” 
( Crowell 2008 , 341). 4
 In sum, the phenomenological strategy put forward by Crowell fl eshes 
out the normativity governing our experiential relation to the world in 
terms of “quasi-inferential” relations that are disclosed by intentional 
agents as they experience such a world. He claims that having such 
experiences—in contrast to McDowell—does not require deploying any 
concepts. 
 So far so good. McDowell provides a framework for placing norms in 
nature and reconciling experience and normativity. Crowell’s phenom-
enology lets us move further in specifying how to understand the norma-
tive character of experience without being committed to a problematic 
form of conceptualism. But contrary to all appearances, the task of reha-
bilitating empiricism remains essentially incomplete. For to reclaim a 
form of empiricism which is compatible with a normative account of 
reasons—which both McDowell and Crowell aim to do—requires not 
only showing how norms can be part of experience but also how inten-
tional agents are sensitive to such norms, i.e., how they are governed by 
such norms and how those norms inform their behavior in action and 
perception. While Crowell insists that intentional agents must be capa-
ble of such norm-guided behavior, the question remains as to whether 
we can account for the capacities of the agents at issue in a naturalistic 
vein. Reconciling norms and nature requires not only placing experience 
in the space of reasons but normative agents in nature. When inten-
tionality is understood in normative terms, the motivation for such a 
subjective dimension of a “rehabilitated empiricism” becomes clearer: 
a normative account of intentionality could not get o  the ground if it 
failed to account for the way norms have a grip on us as natural beings, 
i.e., how they inform the behavior of natural intentional agents. In order 
to demystify these relations—not only norms but normative agential 
 capacities—we need to be in a position to intelligibly place intentional 
agents within a conception of the natural and relate them to the capaci-
ties of other animals belonging to nature. These are two interrelated 
demands of an adequate empiricism in McDowell’s and Crowell’s terms, 
two sides of the same coin: placing experience in the space of reasons 
is one side, placing the capacities of experiencing subjects in nature, the 
other. 
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 As it turns out, Husserl already underscored this point in his criticism 
of Kant. Husserl’s contention is that Kant’s notion of subjectivity is no 
more than a “mythical construction”; it is “his own sort of mythical talk, 
whose literal meaning points to something subjective, but a mode of the 
subjective which we are in principle unable to make intuitive to our-
selves, whether through factual examples or through genuine analogy” 
(Husserl, 1976, Hua VI, 116). According to Husserl, phenomenology, on 
the other hand, focuses also on  concrete subjectivity ( Husserl 1974 , Hua 
XVII, 33/30): i.e., factical features such as “the use of objects, the role 
of cultures and specifi c make-up of bodily motility” ( Nenon 2008 , 437) 
as well as the particular sense through which the  hyle is apprehended 
and the peculiar temporal form of experience. Such elements of concrete 
subjectivity, according to Husserl, do have an explanatory role in the 
transcendental constitution of the world. The biophysical makeup of the 
body, a ectivity, and instincts come into a description of intentionality 
once such an idea of concrete subjectivity is endorsed. 5 This idea can be 
traced back to the very early  Prolegomena to Pure Logic , where Husserl 
claims that “the necessary use of the understanding is, all the same, a 
use of the understanding and belongs, with the understanding itself, to 
psychology” ( Husserl 1975 , Hua XVIII, 66). 
 In sum, an account of intentionality that seeks to do justice to experi-
ence needs to be complemented by an account of the capacities of the 
intentional agents that are able to experience the world in the ways they 
do, a psychological account that makes sense of these normative capaci-
ties as natural and placed in a natural world in a continuum along with 
the intentional, normative capacities of other animals. Such an account 
should be able to answer questions such as, What capacities should a 
creature capable of normative contentful behavior exhibit? How do such 
capacities emerge and develop in ontogeny and phylogeny? Are these 
capacities inherited or acquired through enculturation and training? 
How do they relate to those of other animals? 
 In view of this, it becomes clear that phenomenology is ideally suited 
not only to address one side of the coin but also to complete the task of 
rehabilitating empiricism, that is, of placing intentional agents in nature. 
This is so, not only because of its focus on experience, but crucially, as 
Crowell notes, because it does not identify human cognitive capacities 
with conceptual capacities. Nevertheless, Crowell rejects in principle, as 
we will see, the possibility of providing a phenomenological account of 
rational capacities as human natural capacities. 
 In the next section, we explore the corresponding strategies that 
McDowell and Crowell utilize to place agents in nature and fi nd both 
ill-suited for the task; while McDowell introduces a gap in nature, Crow-
ell denies that any possible account can be given of a subject’s rational 
capacities in natural terms. After explaining how and why this is so in 
the next section, in the fi nal section we present an alternative view that 
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allows us to overcome this problem and show how both norms and 
intentional agents can be placed in nature, as they should if the task of 
rehabilitant empiricism is to be completed, without losing the normative 
dimension that McDowell and Crowell underscore as the distinctive fea-
ture of human minds. 
 Placing Intentional Agents in Nature 
 McDowell directly acknowledges the need to place intentional agents 
in nature. This is precisely the role that the notion of “second nature,” 
appropriated from Aristotle, is meant to play. Second nature is a specifi c 
form of life in which we come to live insofar as we are introduced by 
others in a language and a tradition: “A rational animal could not have 
acquired the conceptual capacities in the possession of which its ration-
ality consists except by being initiated in a social practice” ( McDowell 
2009 , 287). The central idea is that human rational capacities depend 
for their exercise on individuals being initiated in an understanding of 
the articulation of reasons which comes with their upbringing and which 
molds their thinking ( McDowell 1998 , 185). The space of reasons is a 
space we come to inhabit as linguistic creatures. While language enables 
us to make ourselves intelligible to others and others intelligible for us, it 
also underlies the possibility of self-understanding and of having a genu-
ine conceptual engagement with the world. 
 Furthermore, in focusing on the phenomena of meaning and under-
standing, McDowell takes these to be wholly natural phenomena 
despite the fact that they have an irreducibly normative character—a 
character which, for McDowell, cannot be explicated in non-normative 
terms. By McDowell’s lights, it is simply a fact that certain  creatures—
those that have benefi ted from being initiated into special kinds of 
social  practices—become capable of having meaningful or contentful 
states of mind. According to McDowell, it is through a social process 
of enculturation that creatures come to have a second nature, and it is 
by that token that they enter into the space of reasons (see  McDowell 
2009 , 287). 
 But having sharply separated second nature from fi rst nature—i.e., the 
kind of stance someone has by being placed in the space of nature as 
described by natural science—McDowell argues that we are not capa-
ble of explicating or explaining how it is that capacities for contentful 
thought come to exist in nature so understood. Foregoing explanation, 
we can only simply a  rm “our right to the notion of second nature” 
(McDowell 1996, 94–5). Thus, despite his claim that the space of nature 
and that of reasons should be integrated to avoid mythical conceptions 
of how the world impacts our senses and is related to our beliefs and 
other cognitive states, McDowell dichotomizes our understanding of 
nature when it comes to understand the capacities of the agents that have 
15032-2387d-1pass-r01.indd   181 4/8/2019   7:36:59 AM
182 Glenda Satne and Bernardo Ainbinder
such experiences, leaving us with two senses of nature which are for-
ever divided. Following a similar line of thought, Michael  Thompson 
(2017 ,  32) argues that McDowell’s proposal amounts to surrendering 
the notion of fi rst nature to bald naturalists while reclaiming a notion of 
second nature for proper accounts of human rationality. As Rouse nicely 
put it, this leaves us with “a second nature disconnected from any expli-
cable relation to fi rst nature” ( Rouse 2015 , 185). 
 As a consequence of such a disconnection, McDowell’s account of sec-
ond nature is unable to place intentional agents in nature. On his view, 
no account can be given of the capacities that allow an agent to grasp the 
normative structure of the space of reasons as themselves belonging to 
nature. In particular, no natural history of such capacities can be given 
since that attempt would place them outside the space of reasons. Both 
capacities for second nature and the world of second nature itself remain 
primitive posits, not intelligibly connected with humans’ fi rst nature and 
the natural world they seem to inhabit. This follows from the impossibil-
ity of making sense of how second nature connects to fi rst nature. But 
if the capacities at stake were not possibly seen as emerging from and 
enacted in a natural world, the project of reconciling the rational with 
the natural would fail. 
 Phenomenology seems better equipped to deal with the problem of 
placing intentional agents in nature. Since it does not assume that cogni-
tive capacities and normative abilities require language and conceptual 
capacities, it seems that it could provide a picture of how sophisticated 
conceptual normative capacities emerge and develop from more basic 
capacities we share with other animals and young children, capacities 
that do not require the ability to apply concepts. This is precisely what 
Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of instinctive-intentionality, a ec-
tion, and passivity attempts to accomplish. But Crowell rejects such a 
strategy. According to him, phenomenological accounts of such pre-
personal, non-rational processes—carried out in so-called genetic 
phenomenology—rest on an “an illicit ‘naturalistic’ assumption” that 
underlies the “identifi cation of the person with the human being” 6 ( Crow-
ell 2012b , 26). Crowell’s argument runs as follows: “when we ‘situate’ 
the subject in ‘natural processes’ we always do so already privatively, by 
conceiving those processes on the model of our fi rst-person understand-
ing of what it is for me to be” ( Crowell 2014 , 40). As John Haugeland 
puts it, “we can understand animals as having intentional states, but only 
relative to standards that we establish for them. This makes animal inten-
tionality exactly analogous to biological teleology” ( Haugeland 1998b , 
303). That means that “biological systems have only ersatz teleology and 
normativity,” and this itself can only be understood “privately,” in terms 
of their lacking something. This is so because “animals do not commit to 
constitutive standards, hence do not submit themselves to norms, and do 
not understand anything” ( Haugeland 1998b , 304). 
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 Crowell endorses Haugeland’s “existential holism” (see  Haugeland 
1998a , 55 ), the idea that full-fl edged contentful intentionality, unlike 
animal behavior, “is a norm-governed trying to be” ( Crowell 2016 , 232), 
i.e., a capacity that is essentially linked to fi rst-personal responsibility, 
and thus, it is only possible for rational beings. In Crowell’s hands, this 
is the idea that a proper account of intentionality must ground normativ-
ity on agents’ capacities to entertain practical identities in terms which 
they understand and respond to particular norms. In this way, a funda-
mental distinction is drawn between rational agents, those that live up 
to and through practical identities and (nonhuman) animals who don’t. 7
Crowell’s claim here can be seen as fi tting with the widespread agreement 
among contemporary philosophers that there is an important distinction 
between biological beings, subject to biological norms, and rational per-
sons, subject to properly contentful norms. Many authors hold that bio-
logical normativity falls short as a candidate for accounting for the kind 
of responsiveness that an agent capable of grasping truth-evaluable men-
tal contents would be capable of: “Evolution won’t give you more inten-
tionality than you pack into it” ( Putnam 1992 , 33). This is because there 
is a crucial distinction between “functioning properly (under the proper 
conditions) as an information carrier and getting things right (objective 
correctness or truth)” ( Haugeland 1998b , 309). There is “a root mis-
match between representational error and failure of biological function” 
( Burge 2010 , 301), since “natural selection does not care about truth; it 
cares about reproductive success” ( Stich 1990 , 62); that is, “evolution 
doesn’t care about veridicality” ( Burge 2010 , 303). Truth is not always 
adaptation, and adaptation does not necessarily track truth. Thus, even 
if we can speak of biological norms in terms of naturally selected func-
tions specifying what a given organism is meant to do, and hence rule 
out certain performances of those organisms as incorrect in relation to 
the fulfi llment of their selected functions, those norms are fundamen-
tally di erent from the kind of norms that apply to intentional items. 
Intentional states can be assessed as correct or incorrect with respect to 
what they represent, and this is not to evaluate them in terms of norms 
of evolutionary success, survival, and organismic fi tness. While certain 
kinds of organismic responses can be normative in a biological sense, 
this does not mean that they are sensitive to the kind of correction that 
truth-assessable states and responses are sensitive to, and no account can 
be given of the latter in terms of the former. 
 Drawing from Heidegger’s take on organisms in a 1929/1930 lecture 
course, Crowell expands on this idea by arguing that “a phenomenology 
of meaning requires a distinction that cannot be drawn within the con-
ceptual horizon of a metaphysics of life” ( Crowell 2016 , 230). While “the 
metaphysics of life” characteristic of biological accounts of nature calls 
upon a third-person methodology to distinguish regions of being and 
their relations, meaning makes essential appeal to the fi rst-person point 
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of view. If contentful norms are to be sharply distinguished from bio-
logical norms, Crowell claims, the biological nature of human existence 
becomes irrelevant for an account of intentionality: “The fact that higher 
animals are much more similar to us than are robots physiologically, eth-
ologically, and even phylogenetically, is not necessarily signifi cant when 
considering intentionality” ( Haugeland 1998b , 304). Moreover, biologi-
cal and behavioral similarities that could be found between us and other 
higher animals—such as bonobos and chimps, our closer relatives in the 
great ape lineage—cannot ground any claim about cognitive similarities 
between us and them, for any perceived similarity in this domain would 
be dependent on  our own understanding of our conceptual capacities, 
that is, on our bringing them inside the space of reasons, a move that 
cannot be legitimately justifi ed when the capacities to bring one’s own 
response under a fi rst-personally construed practical identity is missing. 
Because of this, conversely, there is no straightforwardly legitimate way 
of seeing our own capacities as having emerged from those of other ani-
mals in a natural evolutionary process, for that would amount to drag-
ging our own capacities outside the space of reasons, into the space of 
nature, thus stripping those states of their defi ning characteristics. 
 This opens up a gap between proper rational intentionality and animal 
ersatz intentionality, and between ourselves conceived in the light of our 
“second nature”—as already responsible rational agents—and us under-
stood in the light of our natural history and our early upbringing, in the 
context of which practical identities are not yet at play. We fi nd a similar 
point in Davidson’s work: 
 The di  culty in describing the emergence of mental phenomena is a 
conceptual problem: it is the di  culty of describing the early stages 
in the maturing of reason, the stages that precede the situation in 
which concepts like intention, belief, and desire have clear appli-
cation. In both the evolution of thought in the history of mankind 
and the evolution of thought in an individual, there is a stage at 
which there is no thought followed by a subsequent stage at which 
there is thought. To describe the emergence of thought would be to 
describe the process which leads from the fi rst to the second of these 
stages. What we lack is a satisfactory vocabulary for describing the 
intermediate steps. 
 (1997/2001 , 127) 
 Davidson thinks that we lack the requisite vocabulary because he 
is committed to the idea—in line with his views on the holism of the 
 mental—that minds can only be discerned and characterized by ascrib-
ing propositional contents to them. Let us call this the “characterization 
problem.” In his view, “words, like thoughts, have a familiar meaning, 
a propositional content, only if they occur in a rich context, for such a 
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context is required to give words or thought a location and a meaning-
ful function” ( Davidson 1997/2001 , 127).  A fortiori , for him, nonverbal 
thought cannot be characterized as a form of thought because it lacks 
the necessary links with contentful attitudes—it stands outside of the 
network of propositional attitudes. For this reason, Davidson doubted 
that there could be “a sequence of emerging features of the mental . . . 
described in the usual mentalistic vocabulary” (Ibid.), since thought/the 
mental can only be present when a su  ciently rich set of rational con-
nections and propositional attitudes can be thought to be present, and 
this only happens when someone speaks a language ( Davidson 2001 ; for 
criticism see  Hutto and Satne 2017 ). 
 As a consequence of this lack of adequate vocabulary—the characteri-
zation problem—Davidson thinks we are left without the resources for 
making sense of the connections between contentful attitudes and the 
rest of nature. In his way of setting things out, the characterization prob-
lem leads to a “connection problem”: the mental as intentionally con-
tentful and the natural are forever divided. This precludes the possibility 
of describing human rationality as located in nature, thus leading to an 
emergence problem as a particular instance of the connection problem, 
as Davidson rightly acknowledges. 
 McDowell follows Davidson in his holism of the mental and in the idea 
that conceptual capacities cannot be given a genetic understanding in the 
natural world of the sort that evolutionary theory privileges for exactly 
the aforementioned reasons. And while Crowell disagrees with David-
son’s and McDowell’s claim that concepts are the mark of the mental, 
he shares their skepticism about the prospects of telling an evolutionary 
story about human intentional capacities. He agrees that we can’t step 
out from the point of view of our human form of life and recognize 
other capacities as capacities that, qua di erent from our own, are inten-
tional for their own sake. In his view, this is because (other) animals lack 
the fi rst-personal responsiveness that is characteristic of our engagement 
with reasons, which is given to us in the form of the construal of practi-
cal identities. In the best case, we can adopt a privative approach toward 
(other) animals and attribute as-if intentional capacities to them. Thus, 
he claims, 
 I can employ teleological modes of explanation in understanding 
nonhuman animals not because I recognize that they and I share an 
ontological region, “life,” but because I constitute them as possessing 
abilities that I possess, but privatively or in modifi ed form. 
 ( Crowell 2014 , 35) 
 This does not rule out the possibility of providing a third-personal descrip-
tion of our biological constitution and of fi nding similarities with the bio-
logical capacities of other animals or such construal of the evolutionary 
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history of our own rational capacities, but such a description would be 
irrelevant for an account of intentionality and intentional agents proper. 
As he argues against the project of genetic phenomenology, 
 [Husserl] believes that he is entitled to the idea that the sense, ‘human 
being’, carries with it reference to natural kinds—not merely in some 
culturally relative sense in which the pre-given world contains various 
familiar ‘types’ of organism, but in the strict sense of scientifi c natu-
ralism. . . . But the importation of this sort of third-person assump-
tion into transcendental phenomenology is pernicious, because it 
makes it seem as though the  pre-personal processes characteristic 
of consciousness conceived as a natural function could somehow be 
‘reconstructed’, in the absence of fi rst-person evidence, as constitu-
tive abilities of transcendental subjectivity . 
 (Crowell 2012b, 41, our emphasis) 
 However, this seems to confl ict with the project of philosophical empiri-
cism to which Crowell claims to be committed. Even if Crowell is right 
that those pre-personal processes cannot per se be identifi ed with rational 
intentional abilities—i.e., that fi rst-personal endorsement cannot be 
eschewed—that does not mean that the description of those contingent, 
psychological and biological features becomes irrelevant, nor does it 
mean that our self-understanding as humans is philosophically irrelevant 
for our concept of ourselves. As we have argued elsewhere, 
 given the contingency of the starting point, the question concern-
ing rational grounding becomes all the more pressing. Such a ques-
tion would take the following form: how can the norms that govern 
rationality, the very norms that can be fi rst-personally endorsed, 
actually inform the behavior of contingent, factual and concrete sub-
jects? How can they inform their bodily movements, their passive 
associations, their attentional shifts? 
 ( Ainbinder forthcoming ) 
 Crowell argues that describing such contingent features of our makeup 
and natural history would amount to abandoning the point of view of 
contentful—objective and fi rst-personal—intentionality. Thus, in his view 
those features do not belong to an account of intentionality proper. To 
include them would just mean changing the topic of discussion entirely. 
But to follow this path is to end up with a new version of the gap between 
fi rst and second nature which we found in McDowell’s and Davidson’s 
work, making it impossible to place agents in natural history and in rela-
tions of natural continuity with (other) animals. Specifi cally, it leaves us 
unable to describe the intermediate steps between agents that are capable 
of fi rst-personal responsibility and those who are not. As a consequence 
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of this lack of adequate vocabulary—a particular form of the characteri-
zation problem—we are left without the resources for making sense of 
the connections between normatively contentful fi rst-personal attitudes 
and the rest of nature. In his way of setting things out, again, this charac-
terization problem leads to a “connection problem”: the mental as fi rst-
personal assessable and the natural are forever divided. This precludes 
the possibility of describing human rationality as located in nature, thus 
leading to an emergence problem as a particular instance of the connec-
tion problem. If this is the case, then the Husserlian project of a phenom-
enological description of the natural origin of our cognitive capacities 
and of the relevance of our biological makeup—i.e., instincts, a ects, 
and certain features of embodiment—for rational contentful intentional-
ity cannot get o  the ground, and, as we have seen, the project of placing 
rationality in nature, and nature in the space of reasons, remains unfi n-
ished and fundamentally incomplete. 
 Crowell’s motivation for opening up the gap derives directly from his 
understanding of the phenomenological method: any form of intentional-
ity is thought to be available to fi rst-person refl ection and evidential ful-
fi llment. Any attempts to characterize alternative forms of intentionality 
would be inferential or speculative, beyond the reach of phenomenologi-
cal clarifi cation grounded on fi rst-person evidence. 8 As a consequence, he 
leaves no room for features of intentionality that are not fi rst-personally 
accessible. 9
 In sum, McDowell and Crowell both rule out placing rational agents 
in nature. In McDowell’s case this was because conceptual capacities can-
not be given a genetic understanding along the lines that evolutionary 
theory privileges. In Crowell’s case, this is because of the unique char-
acter of rational beings’ “form of life” and the way this is given to us in 
the form of practical identities, and its incommensurability with (other) 
animals’ forms of life. 
 We believe that the distinctive character of normative intentional 
capacities emphasized by Crowell and McDowell can be maintained 
while simultaneously elucidating how these capacities can be placed 
in nature, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. There is indeed a 
strategy available that could reintroduce intentional agents into the nat-
ural world without reducing the space of reasons to that of nature and 
thereby changing the topic altogether. It consists not in reducing norma-
tive contentful intentionality, the kind proper to the space of reasons, to 
simpler forms of intentionality—for example those governed by biologi-
cal norms—but rather in providing the genetic and ontogenetic origins 
of such capacities by having recourse to di erent capacities, tools, and 
platforms, such as social practices that contribute to their emergence 
and maintenance (see  Hutto and Satne 2015 ;  Satne and Salice forth-
coming ;  Rouse 2015 ; Okrent 2017). But, to do so, we would need fi rst 
to overcome a crippling assumption that underlies the characterization 
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problem in its di erent forms, the very same assumption that is behind 
Haugeland’s claim quoted at the beginning of this chapter, i.e., “to have 
intentionality is to have (semantic) content” ( Haugeland 1990 , 384). 
This is the idea that intentionality comes only in one form. This is a 
uniformity assumption: that all intentionality is unifi ed by a defi ning 
feature—propositional form in the case of Davidson, conceptual struc-
ture in McDowell’s view, and fi rst-personal responsibility by Crowell’s 
lights. The problem with this assumption is that “restricting intentional-
ity to a small domain [characterized by a defi ning feature], one proper 
to intentional agents . . . is the royal road to conceiving of intentional 
patients in mere ‘as if’ terms [Crowell’s privative approach, Haugeland’s 
ersatz intentionality]” ( Hutto and Satne 2015 , 532). If intentionality is 
uniquely identifi ed with a privileged kind of intentionality under what-
ever of the descriptions that is preferred, the characterization problem 
immediately arises and with it the connection and emergence problems 
that are linked to it, leading to the impossibility of properly placing 
intentional agents in nature. For even if McDowell, Crowell, and David-
son acknowledge the intelligence of certain nonhuman animals, they 
claim that any such ascription of intelligence would require speculation 
on our part about the kind of thinking that is available to them, some-
thing that could not be grounded either in radical interpretation and 
ascription—as Davidsonian methodology suggests—or by means of the 
fi rst-personal methods of phenomenology—as Crowell’s account recom-
mends. This being the case, our own biological nature becomes a matter 
of speculation. 
 In the next section, we claim that in order to place intentional agents in 
nature—i.e., to illuminate the role played by our biological constitution 
in our intentional capacities and to bring to light their developmental and 
phylogenetic roots—we need to make room for many di erent forms of 
intentionality, overcoming the characterization problem, i.e., the conclu-
sion that forms of intentionality that do not belong to the privileged kind 
cannot be properly characterized. This involves dropping the uniformity 
assumption. Assuming, on the contrary that (1) there are di erent kinds 
of intentionality, this is something that Davidson, Crowell, and McDow-
ell seem to acknowledge while at the same time claiming that we some-
how fail to adequately account for them; and (2) all such forms cannot 
be unifi ed by identifying some core common features they all exhibit. As 
we argued, the uniformity thesis that makes intentionality the “exclusive 
province of semantic content” is problematic. In fact, its endorsement 
is the main reason why one is led to assume the impossibility of placing 
agents in nature. Once we remove such an assumption, we claim that 
there is no remaining obstacle in reconciling the rational with the natural. 
This requires showing how understanding “life” in a non-metaphysical 
phenomenological way makes room for “forms of life” in the plural and 
showing why acknowledging that normative contentful capacities cannot 
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be reduced to anything else does not imply that our proposal falls prey to 
the characterization problem that haunted other theories. 
 Pluralizing Intentionality, Pluralizing Life 
 The fi rst step toward a rehabilitation of empiricism capable of account-
ing for the biological nature of intentional agents is revising the notion of 
nature as it was thematized by Sellars. On Sellars’s account, fi rst nature 
is characterized on the model of one particular natural science, physics, 
in which phenomena fall under nomological generalizations proper to 
scientifi c natural laws. It comes as no surprise then that nature so charac-
terized cannot encompass facts of meaning and fi rst-personal responsibil-
ity. In recent years, a number of philosophical naturalist projects 10 have 
challenged that picture of nature, claiming that nature should be thought 
of as including values, interests, and consciousness; that is, that facts in 
nature are facts of experience, not of physics. In the same vein, relaxed 
naturalism (see  Hutto and Satne 2015 ,  2017 ) claims that the philosophi-
cal agenda for a naturalist should not be concerned with reducing facts 
of meaning to the restricted domain of the natural sciences—that is, to 
facts to be found in biology, chemistry, and ultimately physics—but that 
its aim should rather be to clarify the nature of some  explanandum —for 
example, intentionality—by investigating it in a way that draws on and 
seeks to harmoniously integrate the fi ndings of a wide range of relevant 
empirical sciences, including anthropology, developmental psychology, 
comparative psychology, cognitive and phenomenological psychology, 
cognitive archaeology, and so on. The relevant point to note is that 
Relaxed Naturalists do not unnecessarily restrict the tools by which 
those illuminating explanatory connections might be forged, and by this 
token they allow social and normative facts along with those explored 
by the relevant empirical sciences in their account of nature. Importantly, 
relaxed naturalists do not divide up nature into two realms, but rather 
seek to integrate facts of nature studied in di erent sciences, including 
physics, into one single unifi ed reality, in which these are harmoniously 
integrated ( Hutto and Satne 2017 ,  2018 ). 
 Once the conception of nature is broadened in this way, it becomes 
possible to show how intentional agents can be thought to be part of 
nature. It becomes possible, for example, to tell a developmental story 
about how children are initiated into social practices in which they learn 
how to follow norms from others: they became enculturated and initi-
ated into narratives in terms of which they make sense of themselves, 
others, and the world around them. At the same time, the phylogeny of 
the rational capacities required to engage in the training of mind-shaping 
practices can be addressed in this framework by refl ecting on the evolu-
tion of culture and cooperation in the evolutionary trajectory of hominids 
(see  Tomasello 2014 ;  Sterelny 2012 ;  Rouse 2015 ;  Haugeland 1998b ). 
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The central idea behind that explanatory strategy is that the space of rea-
sons can be thought to be “extensionally equivalent to our discursive bio-
logical niche” ( Rouse 2015 , 158; see also  Satne and Salice forthcoming ). 
 This approach holds that we can only make sense of contentful norma-
tive intentionality in the context of shared forms of life in which social 
norm compliance is developed, maintained, and stabilized through shared 
practices. Such practices are not only based on our shared biology but 
on social engagements and cultural devices that evolved over time, espe-
cially linguistic tokens, the primary bearers of semantic content. Accord-
ingly, the capacity to have contentful normative intentionality depends 
essentially on engaging in sociocultural practices in which biologically 
inherited capacities are sca olded in open-ended ways. As is apparent, 
this view shares much with McDowell’s and Crowell’s views of rational 
subjects, but it di ers crucially from them on two counts. 
 First, as opposed to McDowell’s view, in this account the emergence of 
second nature is not a mystery and no commitment to an explanatory or 
evolutionary gap follows, for nature is not divided up into two realms. 
In a story like this, it is possible to describe the empirical makeup of the 
subjects as biologically and psychologically constrained by interactions 
with the world and other beings, a world where sophisticated intentional 
agents coexist along with other creatures intending the same shared natu-
ral world. These forms of life can be intelligibly described as succeeding 
each other in phylogeny, leading to human forms of life. These last are 
characterized by mutual engagements in which di erent agents respond 
to each other and the world rationally in the context of naturally evolved 
sociocultural practices and this is where practical identities have their 
proper milieu. It is in this sense that our form of life is properly called 
human, and not merely that of a rational agent, in that it appears to itself 
as situated and contextual, itself conditioned by instincts, by the body, 
and by the biological constitution that comes with it. 
 This takes us to the second way in which this view di ers from 
McDowell’s, and to the key distinction that separates Crowell’s account 
of intentionality from our own. Namely, to allow for a variety of forms 
of intentionality that are not unifi ed by a set or a single common feature. 
Some of these are contentfully normative—involving the ability to grasp 
truth-evaluable contents—while some, more basic, are characterized by 
mere intentional directedness and the ability to respond to the environ-
ment in intelligent ways without apprehending it in terms of truth and 
falsity or being subject to fi rst-personal assessment and responsibility. 
Furthermore, primitive kinds of intentionality—such as simple forms of 
social cognition and perceptual experiences of a basic non-linguistically 
permeated kind, lacking the normative contentfulness of conceptual 
intentionality, give a platform for the sort of engagement with others 
that leads and has led humans to construe and inherit sociocultural dis-
cursive niches in the context of which practical identities and full-fl edged 
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norm-following develops and unfolds ( Satne forthcoming). Having said 
this, there is still one fi nal obstacle to overcome to allow for such plural-
ism about intentionality. That is showing that our proposal does not fall 
prey to the characterization problem, thus answering the question of how 
are we in the position to describe these di erent forms of intentionality, 
some of which are not contentful or even accessible in the fi rst person. 
 Following Wittgenstein, we propose to embrace the idea that “forms of 
life,” or “life-forms” in Thompson’s terms ( 2007 ,  2017 ), come in many 
varieties and that intentional capacities can be understood contextually 
in connection with such life forms. More importantly, and in contrast to 
McDowell’s and Crowell’s views, each of these domains is not defi ned 
by a common feature but rather there are a number of di erent activities 
and capacities that are part and parcel of a “form of life.” Thus, as Witt-
genstein says in PI 23 and PI 25, requesting, thanking, cursing, and greet-
ing are practices of our forms of life as are eating, walking, and playing. 
These very di erent activities “hang together” as part of our form of life. 
 Furthermore, what makes it possible to understand other animals as 
intentionally directed to the world, albeit sometimes in a di erent way 
than ours, is that their capacities are also contextually situated in com-
plex pattern of activities, some of which they share with us. This, we 
claim, is a fact that is exhibited in our own experience in our life-world. 
This claim does not however involve a commitment to the idea of “an 
ontological region ‘life’ ” that we share with other animals, a “metaphys-
ics of life” and the associated third-personal methodology that grounds 
it, that  Crowell (2016 , 230) rightly rejects. The idea of “form of life” 
does not refer to a metaphysical substratum, defi ned in terms of a fi xed 
set of properties, properties that other animals and we share. Rather, we 
propose that “form of life” should be understood in terms of what Hei-
degger called a “mode of being,” which is not defi ned in terms of a set of 
properties but as a way in which a domain of beings and their properties 
are understood, specifying conditions for their individuation and recog-
nition. 11 Thus, “life” in our view, as in Crowell’s, is a phenomenological 
concept, not a metaphysical one. 
 But even if such a pluralism of forms of life is granted, it is still true 
that in describing other forms of life, there is no alternative than to start 
from our own experience. We see the world from our own perspective 
and according to our own capacities for social interaction and cognition. 
But, crucially, this does not entail the impossibility of cognizing other 
forms of life or our own as belonging to natural history along with such 
other forms. This is because one’s own form of life appears as one among 
many others of which one might have more or less understanding, and 
more or less in common. These facts of experience can be further studied 
by a number of di erent sciences and at di erent levels of complexity, 
uncovering similarities and lineages that are not fi rst-personally acces-
sible. This is the methodological recommendation of relaxed naturalists 
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who seek a unifi ed conception of reality that is jointly construed by the 
di erent sciences, as well as from the point of view of philosophy. In 
sum, on this view, there is no impossibility of placing intentional agents 
in natural history and accounting for our own biological and psycho-
logical nature, for the latter are part of our own nature as we experi-
ence it, something that we can further explore with the tools of di erent 
natural sciences. 
 Pursuing this path that we have developed within the framework of 
relaxed naturalism allows one to place humans in nature together with 
other animals while nonetheless maintaining the uniqueness of the kind of 
engagement that we, as animals who have normative self-understanding, 
enjoy. 
 Notes 
 1  McDowell characterizes this move as two-fold, involving both placing rea-
sons in nature and allowing experience into the space of reasons (McDowell 
1996, xv  ). Unless otherwise noted, all emphases in quotations reproduce 
the original. 
 2  See Crowell 2010, 160, who follows Travis 2007, 227. 
 3  Unfortunately, McDowell does not further elaborate on how such non-
propositional yet still conceptual capacities function. This should come as no 
surprise, since as Crowell rightly notices, “McDowell is relatively uninter-
ested in explaining how conceptual capacities can be drawn on in receptivity. 
His aim is therapeutic rather than constructive” (Crowell 2013, 127). 
 4  Crowell draws on Brandom’s inferentialism to coin his own concept of quasi-
inferentialism. Nevertheless, unlike Brandom’s inferentialism, Crowell’s 
quasi-inferentialism makes room for fi rst-personal access to such normative 
relations. For the lack of a distinctive fi rst-personal dimension in Brandom’s 
inferentialism, see Rödl 2010. 
 5  This is, indeed, what grounds Husserl’s genetic interest in instincts and pre-
egological strata in the constitution of the self. See Ainbinder forthcoming 
for an argument along these lines and against Crowell’s negative reading of 
genetic phenomenology. 
 6  Crowell attributes such an assumption both to those, such as Searle, who 
hold “that the mind (consciousness) is intrinsically intentional and that it is 
in some sense nothing but the brain” and to those who look “for the emer-
gence of intentionality in the evolutionary explanation of the organism and 
its behavior more generally” (Crowell 2012 b , 37n17). 
 7  In Crowell’s words, “one might imagine that the  for-the-sake-of [i.e., the kind 
of responsiveness to norms proper to practical identities] belongs to the tele-
ological structure of animal action. But this would be wrong. Instead, the 
for-the-sake-of corresponds to practical identity” (Crowell 2007, 5). 
 8  We are grateful to Matthew Burch and Irene McMullin for pushing on this 
point. 
 9  It is worth noticing that Crowell’s insistence on the fi rst-personal character 
of phenomenological inquiry is not directly related to the problem of  Evidenz
(if we understand this in verifi cationist terms) but rather to the problem of 
responsibility; facts of experience are facts to which we are responsive and 
for which we are responsible. It is in these terms that Crowell defi nes the fi rst-
personal character of phenomenological inquiry (see Crowell 2007). 
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 10  In particular, enactivist projects of a phenomenological kind: see e.g., Varela, 
Rorsch, and Thompson 1992; Nöe 2004 . 
 11  For a way of understanding Heidegger’s “mode of being” in this sense, see 
Ainbinder, under review. 
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